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ABSTRACT 
The present research aims to understand the law, in a human dignity perspective, in 
regards to the types of negotiations performed under the law of criminal procedure and 
to understand how the discursive practice of lawyers can organize social practices 
from a comparative empirical perspective of Brazil and the United States of America 
emphasizing the bargain, "delação premiada" among others subjects. The method 
used is empirical which implies to immerse in the "real life" of the occurrences. The 
originality derives from the method used itself, since what is observed is unique. In 
other words, the analysis makes part of particular events happened in a singular way. 
The attempt to import models derived from different legal systems creates what is 
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called “cognitive dissonance.” Both the comparison of the similarities between criminal 
negotiation and plea bargaining and the importation of the latter to Brazilian law collide 
in the problem of the paradox. Unlike Brazil, the US Criminal System understands the 
delação premiada as “part of the game”. After all, we cannot forget that the system is 
– believe it or not – a type of game, where attorney (D.A. and Defender) measures his 
strength. While Brazil, nowadays, seems to be under a new system, the US use it as 
part of his historical Criminal System. 
 
KEYWORDS: Practice; Delação Premiada; Comparative; Bargain; Empirical. 
 
 
RESUMO 
A pesquisa procura compreender o Direito, à luz da dignidade humana, em uma 
perspectiva empírica comparada (Brasil e EUA), bem como entender como a prática 
discursiva dos juristas pode organizar as práticas sociais, enfatizando a barganha, 
delação premiada dentre outros institutos jurídicos correlatos. A pesquisa investiga, 
em uma perspectiva comparada, processos institucionais de construção da verdade 
perante os órgãos do poder judiciário brasileiro e dos EUA, focando um estudo 
comparativo – por meio de suas diferenças – da transação penal dos Juizados 
Especiais Criminais e o instituto da plea bargaining, largamente utilizado no sistema 
judicial dos EUA. O método utilizado é o empírico o que implica em uma imersão nos 
acontecimentos da “vida real”. A originalidade deriva do método em si, tendo em vista 
que o que é observado é um evento singular. A tentativa de importar-se modelos que 
são provenientes de sistemas jurídicos diversos cria o que se denomina de 
“dissonância cognitiva”. Tanto a comparação entre a transação penal e a plea 
bargaining pelas suas semelhanças, bem como a importação deste último ao direito 
brasileiro, esbarram na problemática do paradoxo. Diferentemente do Brasil, o 
sistema criminal norte-americano entende a delação premiada como “parte do jogo”. 
Afinal, nós não podemos nos esquecer de que o sistema norte-americano é um tipo 
de jogo, em que os operadores do direito (ministério público e os defensores) medem 
suas forças pelo poder de persuasão da barganha. Enquanto o Brasil, atualmente, 
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parece antever um novel sistema, o sistema de justiça criminal norte-americano o 
utiliza como parte de sua história sistêmica. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Prática; Delação Premiada; Negociação; Barganha; 
Comparado. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The distinction between theory and practice is the cornerstone of legal 
interpretation. The ideas behind theory and practice lead toward two different roads at 
different speeds. It has been said that it is commonplace to talk about human rights; 
however, little has been achieved in terms of the effectiveness of turning aspirations 
into factual rights. The prevalent methodology is qualitative, consisting of fieldwork, 
participant observations, and comparisons between the systems in question. This 
observation was made in person in the courts of first instance, both in Brazil and the 
United States, and achieved effective participation of those who will receive the 
adjudication simply by being there. 
 
 
2  FIELDWORK ON PLEA BARGAINING 
 
If it were possible to choose a basic premise to contextualize the criminal 
justice system in the United States, it would be the following: “controlling the 
coexistence with impurity and crime, and not purifying it or banishing it”(KANT DE 
LIMA, 2008). 
According to the same author, this would be the same as affirming that crime 
in the United States has a relationship with sin. In other words, crime is a voluntary 
choice of the perpetrator. There is a clear division between those who obey these 
consensual rules and those who deliberately and explicitly defy these rules. In addition, 
this has an immediate and direct relationship with the form of production of truth in the 
adversarial model, which is based on a constant search for consensus. Unlike Brazil, 
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the United States judicial system’s search for consensus is essential for the recognition 
of self-knowledge. 
 
2.1  THE FIRST CONTACT 
 
“This is the best thing that I can do for him.” This was one of the first phrases 
I heard at an informal hearing of plea bargaining that took place in the chamber1 of the 
Hall of Justice in San Francisco. The following individuals were present: the District 
Attorney, the defendant’s lawyer, and the judge. The words of the District Attorney 
were addressed—in front of the judge—to the lawyer of the defendant. These words 
were related to a proposal that had just been presented to allow the defendant to avoid 
a trial. In other words, the acceptance of the offer by the defendant would represent 
the end of the dispute and, as a consequence, the resolution of the conflict. The 
sentence would then be imposed not from a procedure that targets the search for the 
“truth” of the facts but from an agreement with the purpose, among others, to avoid 
trial. The lawyer—waiting for the judge’s reaction (who remained inert) —decided to 
accept the proposal. 
The scene above describes not only what is observed in everyday life in 
American criminal courts, but also is much more than that: it is, in fact, the core of the 
“ritual” of almost all defendants accused of having committed a crime. The cinematic 
image of the American judgments performed in the presence of the jury only occurs in 
a small number of cases, as will be observed. On average, almost 96% of the criminal 
cases before U.S. courts are resolved through a negotiation called plea bargaining 
(BLUME, 2014). 
As one who comes from a civil culture, it was initially a natural curiosity to 
discover the juridical rules that regulate plea bargaining. After all, if almost all of the 
cases are assessed according to this rule, it would be expected that a detailed formal 
procedure of the entire legal ritual in use is available. 
The first attempt was to use the index of the California Penal Code,2 which 
resulted in the identification of the first obstacle. The initial impressions from the 
                                                     
1 Chamber is the term assigned to the office used by the judges within the court. 
2 CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West). 
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common law dated back to an idea of a small number of written rules and a wide use 
of legal precedents. In other words, there was a notion that customary law had its roots 
in solving its disputes in the tradition of previous trials. This is what is generally taught 
in the law courses in Brazil. Note that there was a complete lack of formal legal rules, 
but their existence was imagined to be limited to the formulation of general rules and 
the characterization of a reasonable number of crimes. The very principled, generic 
conception of the U.S. Constitution provided this first notion. 
There was, however, a Code of over 34,370 sections in California, 
notwithstanding the existing extravagant criminal legislation. 3  In contrast, the 
combined number of articles of the Brazilian penal code and criminal procedure code 
is 1,172 (361 articles of the penal code and 811 of the criminal procedure code).4 In 
addition, the subdivisions of the sections of the California Penal Code can be extremely 
long, as they are sometimes written in an informal language with a highly explicative 
intention. For example, California Penal Code § 830 with its subdivisions fills twenty-
three pages of the Code.5 We must remember in advance that there is no separate or 
distinct criminal procedure code in the state of California. All procedural rules are 
embedded in the actual California Penal Code. In fact, contrary to what we have in 
Brazil, there is no academic concern associated with conducting a detailed study on 
the nature of the procedure as a mere instrument for conflict resolution or as a true 
autonomous figure. Incidentally, when pursuing the criminal procedure discipline in the 
literature used in the universities, the primary focus is on the constitutional principles 
of criminal procedure. 
First, I searched for a systematic index in which the formulation of the 
disicipline of plea bargaining rules could be found. There was no exclusive section for 
plea bargaining in the index. I then performed a quick reading of the 639 sections 
associated with the rules of criminal procedure of the state of California. This search 
was also in vain. Despite some scarce retrievals of the term “plead guilty” throughout 
the code, there were no plea bargaining regulations. Moreover, there was not even the 
impression that it would be possible to use this procedure. A simple reading of the 
                                                     
3 CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West). 
4 BRAZIL.C.C.; BRAZIL C.P.P. 
5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 830-830.15 (West 2016). 
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code led to the belief that the trial, either by a jury or by the judge himself (in the form 
of a bench trial), was the most common destination of the cases to be examined by 
the judiciary branch. 
Before investigating the legal literature that would be the pillar of the legal 
institution of plea bargaining, I decided to search for answers from actual practitioners 
of law. In other words, I decided to research the common notion among those who 
used it more. When I posed this inquiry to a former public defender, he replied, “I 
believe there is no special section of the disciplinary code for this theme. It is more of 
a procedure established by decisions.”6 In this answer, we can see an uncertainty 
related to the non-existence of formal laws on the subject. This uncertainty in itself 
already indicated something: even if there was a regulation, it would not be the main 
parameter of the operators of law. If this is not the case, the public defender would at 
least declare its existence, even if he did not know its contents). 
When Judge “J” from the Hall of Justice was asked this intriguing question, he 
replied evasively without facing the problem directly: 
 
 
This is an interesting question. I believe there are some sections of the code 
that do not “advise” plea bargaining in some situations. Well, I do not know 
... I have been a judge for only 3 years. Before this period, I was a public 
defender for nearly 30 years. Throughout this period of 30 years, I 
participated in several plea bargaining hearings in San Francisco and in 
many other Counties. And each site uses a different type of procedure. Only 
in counties with higher crime rates you will find plea bargaining as you find it 
in San Francisco. In counties where there is no high index of crimes of greater 
offensive potential, you do not even notice the participation of the judge in 
the negotiations. The District Attorney will make an offer and it is done! And 
it has an explanation in my view. A greater number of crimes obviously results 
in a greater number of cases.7 
 
 
It is perhaps for this reason that this theme captured so much of my attention. 
Upon arriving in the U.S., there was no precise delimitation of the subject to be 
investigated. There was a desire to investigate the models of the production of truth in 
the American process. In addition, at first sight there was no production of truth to be 
actually “found” but rather negotiated in a system of dispute settlement that has a huge 
legal standardization. This however is apparently used only for cases that are brought 
                                                     
6 Interview with former public defender (2010). 
7 Interview with Judge “J”, California Hall of Justice (April, 2012). 
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to trial. In other words, the solution to almost all of the disputes brought to court is 
based on a procedure performed backstage of the courtroom and that has as its 
premise a procedure that is not formally legislated.  
The California Penal Code was primarily mentioned by the actors of the 
process as will be shown later to verify a possible legal classification of the criminal 
conducts. 8  Thus, the widespread use of this ritual, which dictates almost all 
prosecutions, and the ritual that follows the recent tradition were the main reasons for 
the thematic delimitation. In fact, plea bargaining has become the “talk of the town.” It 
is rare to find someone even outside of the legal field who is unfamiliar and does not 
have his own opinion on the subject. This is not a procedural technicality. In Brazil, 
these discussions are limited to the defendants, and in most cases to their 
representatives. 
 
2.2  THEJUDGE’S PARTICIPATION IN THE BARGAINING  
 
Even though there is no legal provision under state law or in Title 18 of the 
U.S. Code the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (rules issued by the Supreme 
Court and approved by the Congress) they do however define plea agreement, which 
is, in essence, the same as plea bargaining.9 Despite being also limited to the sphere 
of federal crimes, such rules serve only as a legal basis or doctrinal foundation. In fact, 
there is a manifest rule to prohibit the participation of the judge in the negotiation. “The 
court must not participate in these discussions.” 10  However, in practice, the 
participation of the judge is unambiguous with respect to the cases resolved at the 
state level. 
From this informal negotiation, only two situations may occur: 
1) There is consensus on the proposal: In this case, the defender consults the 
defendant (who is usually under arrest in the same building and waiting in a nearby 
room) or, if free on bond, out in the hallway or a conference room to determine whether 
                                                     
8 Interview with Judge “J”, California Hall of Justice (April, 2012). 
9 FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 11. 
10 FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 11. 
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he agrees to the presented conditions. If the defendant agrees, then the formal right 
(in a hearing to be held afterwards) of pleading guilty will take place. 
2) There is no consensus on the proposal: Strictly, dissent marks the beginning 
of the instruction of the legal process for further judgment. However, plea bargaining 
is the ultimate destination for almost all of the cases that are brought before the court. 
A lack of agreement is usually only in practice a postponement for a supervening 
negotiation. Plea bargaining can recur at any time, even during the jury trial. 
In the early stage of my fieldwork, the judge received me with great kindness 
and said “if plea bargaining is what you are looking for, this is the right place.”11 While 
we were sitting in his chambers, the judge pulled a chair and placed it next to him. 
After a few minutes, he initiated the possibility of negotiations, which were presented 
by the prosecutor. First, he introduced me to all of the assistant district attorneys and 
defenders present, highlighting my position as observer. After the completion of the 
backstage negotiations and a brief pause granted by the judge, all of the participants 
headed to the courtroom. Strictly, all of the defenders had already consulted their 
clients regarding the proposals prior.  
The courtroom proceedings were nothing more than the formal approval of the 
negotiation; in some cases there was an agreement, but for the others, there was a 
postponement.12 The judge called the defendants (one by one) to warn and inquire as 
to whether the defendant was aware of the consequences of the declaration of guilt. 
The judge pronounced the sentence before the formal acceptance. 
 
2.3  COMMON SENSE AND THE PLEA BARGAIN 
 
The nationally known journalist, Morley Safer, who leads the television 
program 60 Minutes interviewed the Attorney General of Rhode Island, Arlene Violet 
(MCCOY, 1993, p.129-130). Promptly, the interviewer introduced his idea about the 
system, which, according to him, would be common sense: “One of the blots on the 
legal landscape in the USA is plea bargaining” (MCCOY, 1993, p.129-130). 
                                                     
11 Interview with Judge “J”, California Hall of Justice (2011). 
12 The (re)scheduling of the hearings drew attention due to its transparency and informality. Everything 
was done by consensus (the consent of all participants was indispensable).  
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At this moment, he simulated in a monologue a conversation between a District 
Attorney and a defender (MCCOY, 1993, p.129-130): 
 
 
I know that my client spanked his partner, who was 50 years old, during the 
last 6 weeks. However, if my client chooses to declare that he is not guilty and 
to take the case to trial, we will have at least 6 weeks of your time (in addition 
of your entire team). However, if he declares guilty, he will obtain a lighter 
indictment. Let us reach an agreement. Give him three months [in prison]. [...] 
Is this not what happens in most cases? 
 
 
In turn, Arlene Violet rebated without hesitation (MCCOY, 1993, p.129-130): 
 
 
No! Plea bargaining is just a blot that ignores the quality of justice: there is no 
balance between plea bargaining and what actually happened in the case. If 
you bring me a case and if you are honest, you will sit down and say, ‘Arlene, 
here is the proof that I have for my case, and here are my weaknesses. And 
the role of the data is such and such.’ I will look deep in your eyes and say, ‘I 
disagree with you on this, this, and this. We have this body of evidence.’ Thus, 
we will try to obtain what justice does in these cases. That is what plea 
bargaining does. 
 
 
The dialogue in the interview portrays the tension between the opinions from 
“those of the outside” and “those of the inside” (MCCOY, 1993, p.129-130). From the 
external perception, something is notorious: negotiation, in practice, sacrifices quality 
for quantity, i.e., for justice to demonstrate, in absolute numbers, its efficiency. In 
contrast, the ones involved in the process see plea bargaining as a legal and ethical 
process that is well-structured according to the known methods that will lead to 
negotiation (MCCOY, 1993, p.129-130). 
It is worth mentioning that the biggest problem, in the words of the Attorney 
General, is “ignoring the fact that negotiations are rarely performed by clearing things 
up” (MCCOY, 1993, p.129-130). In fact, the opposite normally occurs. In this study, 
the connection between plea bargaining and the trial itself remains clear. In the 
beginning, some of the strategies that would be eventually released in the trial are 
anticipated. This interlacing shows my assertion. To clear up a matter during the 
negotiation phase would anticipate what you have on hand for a future judgment, which 
would be suicide for any party. Thus, the opposite is observed. In the field, what we 
often see is a game of “bluffs” because one attempts to show strength and thus hides 
some cards up one’s sleeve. 
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2.4  THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A LEGAL BASIS FOR PLEA BARGAINING 
 
It would be difficult to understand plea bargaining without understanding a 
little-studied phenomenon (even in the legal literature in the U.S.): the figure of the 
prosecutor. As we will find, its genesis does not have any similarity with what the 
Brazilian legal culture understands as public ministry. In a controversial, but well 
accepted, study, Allen Steinberg (STEINBERT, 1984, p.592) intended to demonstrate 
that the image of a public prosecutor, which is a representative of the people, has been 
around since 1920 (GANS, 1973, p.132). He stressed that the majority of Americans, 
when thinking about the operation of the prosecution (District Attorney), already have 
in mind a public figure that represents an independent power and has a high power of 
discretion, which leads many authors to state that prosecutors have more power than 
the judges themselves (STEINBERT, 1984, p.592). 
In contrast, he stated that this public representative has mysterious origins with 
very few notes prior to the year 1880. In a previous period, the figure of the private 
prosecutor prevailed because a citizen always initiated criminal causes (LEA, 2003). 
During the greater part of the nineteenth century, the criminal system had, as a root, a 
relationship of voluntarism among the citizen (pursuer) and the judiciary (Unraveling, 
2005). In addition, this volunteerism means nothing more than the discretion involved 
due to the private nature of this relationship (Unraveling, 2005). 
Therefore, on the question of private prosecution, the important thing is to 
realize through the study that this discretion is “transferred” to the current figure of the 
District Attorney (Are There Limits, 2003). Proof of this transference is that the District 
Attorney is elected.13 In Brazil, due to the principle of obligation, this discretion does 
not exist. Even in those cases in which the principle of obligation does not exist 
anymore, this does not occur in the same manner. Moreover, it is precisely because 
they are elected that these individuals should be held accountable for their actions; the 
understanding of the institution of accountability is paramount to the understanding of 
the main differences between the two systems. 
                                                     
13 As a matter of fact, some Attorney Generals become governors but these are people who hold state-
wide office, usually not the local District Attorney or State’s Attorney who is elected at the local (i.e. 
county) level. 
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In this sense, Vera Ribeiro de Almeida authoritatively observes the following 
(ALMEIDA, 2012): 
 
 
Even if one defends that the negotiation was imported from this model, as 
among us there is no mechanism of accountability, our prosecutors keep 
acting in accordance with the authority that each one judges having, without 
such choices being permitted by law or any concern about the future 
responsibility of such choices. 
 
 
In Brazil, the state is the one one who holds justice in its hands. The King is 
the Emperor. These differences in origin demonstrate how these systems are 
anchored in different places. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the identification of 
plea bargaining is linked to this feature of discretion, which does not occur in Brazil. 
Even though the declaration of guilt had already appeared in the American 
colonial period, its effects were very diverse. The literature suggests that these 
declarations were relatively rare and treated with suspicion. The declaration of guilt, 
notably with felony crimes that deserved more severe punishment, often led to the 
execution of the accused; as a result, judges themselves were suspicious that the 
accused acted as a result of coercion or of misinformation. For this reason, the judges 
prompted the defendants to exercise their rights associated wiht trial proceedings. 
The concept of plea bargaining—the negotiation between the prosecution and 
the defenders with the purpose of promoting the declaration of guilt aimed at 
bargaining—was an unknown practice in the U.S. until the nineteenth century 
(STEINBERT, 1984, p.584-585). Before this period, cases tried by jury were generally 
decided more quickly, without significant regard for formal evidence examination and 
procedure (STEINBERT, 1984, p.592). It was common for lawyers to represent both 
parties in the same dispute. Moreover, no catalysts existed to promote the 
development of a plea bargaining system before the nineteenth century (STEINBERT, 
1984, p.592). The change in these characteristics led to the first movements in favor 
of such an institution. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. was faced 
with a sudden change from a system of trials to a plea bargaining system, which was 
already the most widely used method of conflict resolution (STEINBERT, 1984, p.584). 
In this analysis, we return to the initial idea of plea bargaining regulation. This 
transformation was neither the result of an introduction of, or changes in, the 
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legislation, nor the result of a formal creation of rules by the judiciary itself—something 
usually observed in the U.S., notably by the Supreme Court (STEINBERT, 1984, 
p.585). According to legal scholars, the adoption of this transformation originated in 
large part from the response of the prosecutor to the excess of cases submitted to the 
judicial branch (STEINBERT, 1984, p.592). 
The increase in its use occurred especially because of the usual (and 
expected) causes present in the modification of the rituals of the judiciary in various 
parts of the world. In other words, the increases in both the population and the crime 
rates spurred the increase (STEINBERT, 1984, p.572). In addition, the increase in the 
complexity of trials by jury and the professionalization of criminal justice favored the 
rise in the use of plea baragining. Plea bargaining became the D.A.’s first attempt at a 
solution to legal disputes, because the D.A. did not have enough time and resources 
to monitor every case that went to trial (STEINBERT, 1984, p.585). 
It is remarkable that, through field research, I was able to observe that plea 
bargaining is a necessity for many practitioners as a condition on the sound functioning 
of justice. As soon as I approached one of the operators, and showed my interest in 
performing a comparative research study about the system, the burning question on 
their minds was, “How does plea bargaining work in Brazil?” 
My reply was ready and immediate: “We have not, in Brazilian criminal 
proceedings, an institution that has a similarity plausible to the point to finding similar 
categories; we have, only, figures with links that may bring about a confronting 
research.” Later in the conversation, I only made a brief reference to our penal 
negotiation—even though the two systems share more differences than similarities. 
However, the following inquiry—loaded with an obvious strangeness/irony—arises: 
“However, how do you, then, judge all the cases?” 
In principle, this question brings forth a twofold analysis: (1) who are the 
subjects that reveal this inquiry/strangeness; and (2) what this question informs us in 
the foreground. With regards to the first analysis I can state that to my surprise, I 
noticed this inquiry in all sectors of society, including outside the milieu of legal 
practitioners. This question was the main area of interest for the vast majority of judges, 
defenders, engineers, civil servants. This first point of analysis lends itself to the 
second point of examination. The question, and therefore the perception, of plea 
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bargaining is not limited to actors in the legal system. Generally, it is common 
knowledge that the existence of plea bargaining arose from pragmatic conerns. In 
principle, it is not better or worse, but rather the solution that was found, either if it is 
palliative or already definitive in U.S. society. It was as if my American interlocutor 
wanted to ask me, “How does your model work without the existence of plea 
bargaining?” Some of the interviewed individuals even came to their own immediate 
conclusions: “I suppose that the number of judges in Brazil is large.” 
Of course, the absence of an immediate solution to cope with this method is 
not the only reason for the “success” of this powerful procedure for penal prosecution. 
Several other reasons corroborate this situation, which incidentally, was one of the 
main objects of study in my research. Without prejudice to the subsequent detailed 
analysis, I have recently heard of an academic who appeared at the university in which 
I was doing my research, who stated a phrase that introduced another characteristic 
of great relevance in the U.S., and is also one of the fundamental aspects of plea 
bargaining: the adversarial system. 
The idea of a solution to the dispute as part of a game between opposite 
opponents, which have a thirst for victory, lead the abovementioned scholar to allude 
to the words of a famous football coach speaking on victory: “Winning is not everything; 
it is the only thing” (DURE, 2015).   
Victory, game, opponent, and defeat are expressions that denote not only a 
relationship—as could be seen at first—with the solution to the disputes found in trials, 
but also to the negotiation of plea bargaining. The bargain is also negotiated in a 
behind the scenes arena, which is typical of the adversarial system. For this reason, I 
asked Judge “J” what he would alter in the institution of plea bargaining. Showing 
surprise, he replied: 
 
 
Well, I had never thought about it ... Well, I believe that the reason for the 
existence of plea bargaining - and I think that you have already realized this - 
is that, with 15,000 arrests (for felonies) per year in San Francisco, we would 
only be able to judge [referring to trial] approximately 700 per year. That is, we 
must eliminate these cases in some way. If this did not happen ... well, you 
must be aware through the newspapers of the budget cuts to our court. Well, 
even in our best [financial] season, it would be impossible for us to take the 
majority of the cases to trial. It is necessary to have plea bargaining... or there 
would not be a criminal system ... particularly in San Francisco. Theoretically 
speaking, the aim of the institution is to punish the accused. The other purpose 
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is to ‘clean the agenda’ to allow the trial of those cases that are really 
necessary. Thus, bearing in mind that the purpose is to reduce the number of 
cases, if I could change the law, I would amend it to enable plea bargaining 
during trials. But, as I have already said, this only happens in San Francisco. 
Another change that I would make is the following: I believe that, in the 
negotiations that occur before the preliminary hearing (only between the 
parties), only two or three experienced District Attorneys should be chosen for 
all cases. They should not be very strict and conservative Attorneys.14 
 
 
 
2.5  PLEADINGGUILTY AND THE PATH TO THE BARGAIN DISCRETION 
 
It is important to notice, in advance, that the approval of plea bargaining by the 
Supreme Court of the United States did not introduce any innovation in relation to plead 
guilty in itself, i.e., with regards to the statement of guilt (TURNER, 2006, p.560). It 
always existed and had (and still has) its various functions within the American judicial 
model (TURNER, 2006, p.562). The innovative and formal approval by the Supreme 
Court stressed that the American Constitution does not impose an obstacle to plea 
bargaining (TURNER, 2006, p.565). In other words, what took place was the formal 
cementing of one more facet of pleading guilty. It would also be the “bargaining chip” 
for plea bargaining. The accused must declare himself/herself guilty as a sine qua non 
condition to have the opportunity to bargain. The bargain is not only limited to the 
intention of reducing the penalty to be imposed, as might appear through a first 
analysis. It goes well beyond this. From the moment in which the accused declares 
himself/herself guilty, the negotiating parties (here, as will be observed hereafter, we 
can include the judge) establish the highest degree of discretion.15 
I also asked Judge “J” about this discretion, especially its limits, and obtained 
the following answer: 
 
 
Yes, the District Attorney has full discretion with regards to the accusation. In 
addition, once indictment is formulated, it can be modified at any time. In fact, 
I remember that, at the time when I was a defender, I participated in an 
interesting case in which the defendant was accused of murder and I lead a 
negotiation for modifying the indictment to disturbing the peace, which is a 
low-relevance crime. And I think that this happened for a reason. Often the 
police do not have conviction that the accused actually committed the crime. 
                                                     
14 Interview with Judge “J”, California Hall of Justice (2012). 
15  I avoid using the Portuguese term “discricionariedade” and prefer the term discretion to more 
accurately denote the broad contrast that we found in this area if we compare the Brazilian system with 
that of the USA. 
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When the District Attorney realizes that he will not obtain conviction of the 
criminal practice even by frightening the defendant, he needs to give some 
type of answer. Thus, he eventually chooses the crime which, in my view, 
would be the “minor” existing offense [disturbing the peace]).16 
 
 
However, when I asked about the mythicizing of the judge’s neutrality in this 
process, he said: 
 
 
The judge fully has the final word. Well, there are different philosophies among 
judges, but clearly, if the judge does not like the offer, he can just not accept 
it. For example, the judge who preceded me often left aside the negotiations 
that would occur previously. In all these years, I have only done this once. I 
have another philosophy. If the District Attorney and the public defender 
arrived at an agreement [...] They are well aware of the case. The defender 
knows well what is best for the accused, and the District Attorney is aware of 
what would be the best option for society.17 
 
 
Moreover, we can see one of the most striking characteristics of plea 
bargaining in this statement. In one of my first visits to the judge’s chamber (where the 
prior negotiation occurred, in the manner described at the beginning of this work), I 
realized that, when the prosecutor, the lawyer, and the judge start the negotiation 
(assuming that there was a possibility of a declaration of guilt), there was a large 
opening regarding the “destination” of the accused. I realized that it was very common 
to “choose” the legal classification of the committed crime. In other words, even if they 
were all certain that there was a crime of drug trafficking, it would be possible to 
stipulate that the defendant would be charged with the crime of possession of drugs 
and, therefore, receive a punishment that was compatible and proportional with the 
stipulated practice (and not performed!). The prosecution, therefore, will be formulated 
by a symbolic fact, which is “created” by means of a negotiation. Indeed, a German 
judge said the following in an interview: “[P]lea bargaining can weaken the duty of the 
judge to investigate the ‘truth of the facts' [...] the judge has a smaller chance of 
checking the basis of the [facts]” (TURNER, 2006, p.225). 
On the negotiating table, the penal code does not serve as a parameter for the 
suitability of the practiced conduct but as a range of options that serves as a helm for 
the choice (pick up) of the punishment to be applied. 
                                                     
16 Interview with Judge “J”, California Hall of Justice (2012). 
17 Interview with Judge “J”, California Hall of Justice (2012). 
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Conversely, in Brazil, the first steps in the theory of criminal law already show 
us that one of the basic principles of the law (it is not just about the criminal sphere) is 
the legality (MENDONÇA, 2016). Both the Constitution and the penal code stipulate 
that there will be no crime if the law does not previously set the conduct that is 
eventually practiced; in addition, there will be no punishment without prior legal 
application (MENDONÇA, 2016). This is a principle under which various decisions are 
made. 
I was once struck with an interesting comparison: the idea of plea bargaining 
is the same as that of “grade bargaining,” i.e., a negotiation between a teacher and a 
student. Let us suppose that a school assignment has been submitted to the teacher 
and, after a brief look at the first page, the teacher tells the student that, if he would 
carefully read the entire work and apply his usual strict rules, he would most likely 
decide to grant it a “D” grade. However, if the student relinquished his right to have his 
work meticulously examined and consciously criticized, the professor would agree to 
grant it a “B” grade. Considering that the student gives precedence for the general 
average of grades—and less precedence to learning and the justice of the grade—the 
satisfied student accepts the “B” grade, and the teacher is satisfied with the reduction 
in their workload (KIPNIS, 1976). 
Although the illustration is interesting, it does not correspond faithfully to what 
occurs in plea bargaining, particularly in relation to one of its premises. First, in the 
illustration, the professor would have a dual role, which is to say, prosecutor and judge. 
Second, in the example given, the teacher already predetermines that a well-
established analysis (i.e., a trial) would imply a lower grade (i.e., a high/rigorous 
penalty). This predetermination (at least in the manner of this illustration), however, 
does not exist in plea bargaining, especially if we bear in mind that, although the 
punishment is stipulated by the judge, it will be the task of the jury (which is not included 
in the negotiation) to “tell the ‘truth’ of the facts” (KIPNIS, 1976). 
In the academic seats of university degree courses in Law, we have already 
learned the old adage (formalized in the Constitution) according to which the citizen 
might do (or fail to do) everything that the law does not prohibit, whereas the public 
man can only achieve what is expressly defined by the rule of law. In the U.S., we 
observe something quite different. The idea of discretion by the police officer is 
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commonplace in American society, which accepts it (to a certain extent). 18  One 
academically 19  learns that discretion may imply the ignoring of minor offenses 
(expressly provided by the law). In a core work of the American criminal system, I have 
expressly read that “the lower the severity of the offense, the greater the freedom that 
the police has to ignore it” (COLE, 2007, p.187). In addition, George Cole adds that 
even politeness can be a determining factor in discretion: “[. . .] a suspect that 
demonstrates respect for the officer has a lower probability of being arrested than he 
who in the opposite manner” (COLE, 2007, p.187). Or, as said by Benjamim Franklin: 
“Laws too gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, seldom executed” (MELTON JR, 
p.161). I would like to emphasize that this is not, therefore, a “corrupt” act of the local 
authority. The explicit nature of such practices is a consequence of the natural social 
acceptance of the acts. Moreover, it is also true that this social acceptance strengthens 
the character of transparency. 
In the normative field, one also sees this transparency: the expression 
discretion appears seventy-seven times in the California Penal Code, which regulates 
a great diversity of subjects.20  In the same line of reasoning, plea bargaining also 
represents the portrait of this possibility of resolving the dispute without being tied to 
the rules of legal application. I began this section with the phrase “This is the best thing 
I can do for him.”21 It is with the same transparency and informality that “plea bargain” 
negotiations are held. 
Participant observations, open interviews, and other methods of fieldwork 
were performed in direct and unabated contact for a considerable period of time with 
the involved actors. The dialogue justifies why it is necessary to incorporate the 
reasons of the actors within the environment in which the researcher starts to act. 
                                                     
18 On the reasonableness of this measure (in fact, on the control of this measure), it is worth referring 
to the article by Sanford Kadish, who mentions the principle of legality. He says that “In terms of fact, of 
course, the practice reduces this ideal to a myth, and the need to preserve the existence of the ideal in 
these mythological terms has tended to divert attention from the nature of the problem presented: Is it 
subversive of the principle of legality that the police in fact exercise a wide discretion (…)?" (KADISH, 
1961). 
19 In this, one could read, for example, the following statement: “It implies that the police might decide 
not to make an arrest even in those situations in which a crime has just been committed, when the 
accused and the evidence are “at hand.” This tends to portray the police as something other than an 
automated machine, as men whose judgment-discernment is essential in determining whether it is 
reasonable or not to invoke penal prosecution.” (GOLDSTEIN, 1963). 
20 CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West). 
21 CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West), Section II.a. 
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Fieldwork involves an inter-subjective relation in which there is no neutrality, but rather 
an interest to incorporate the environment. It is essential to know what the interlocutors 
think. Consequently, it is necessary to contextualize the collected data within an 
academic culture. In fact, good science requires fieldwork, as information is extracted 
from the actors that participate in the process.  
There is no intention to assert that traditional rituals never work; the ancient 
custom of praying in Latin, which is performed by the priest, reaches its goal of 
maintaining the ignorance of the faithful. However, the claim made here is part of the 
communication inclusion. 
 
 
3  “DELAÇÃO PREMIADA À MODA BRASILEIRA” AND THE PROCEEDINGS IN 
US 
 
The distinction between delação premiada in Brazil and the proceedings in US 
is often blurred. It is crucial to stress that, unlike Brazil, in US, the delação premiada is 
part of the whole system of the plea bargain. 
It is not unusual to translate delação premiada as confidential informant, 
cooperating witness, whistleblowers22. These (not all of them) are much more related 
to what we call in Brazil as agente infiltrado (FITZGERALD, 2015). I have just used the 
expression “not all of them”. There is a reason: ehe US System, besides the agente 
infiltrado, has much more options related to this matter, that is why there are so many 
names to define similar subjects. 
It is simple to understand the close relation between declaração premiada and 
plea bargaing. We have to remember – again – that the US Criminal System is, nearly, 
sole based on the plea bargaining. And the bargain, itself, covers what we call delação 
premiada. When one is accused, he may bargain “cooperating” and witnessing against 
another one aiming reduce his punishment. On the other hand, confidential informant, 
cooperating witness and whistleblowers are not defendants. 
                                                     
22 By the way, during the interviews I was unable to find someone who could give me a close translation 
to the term (even among between scholars who may understand and speak Portuguese). 
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Again: unlike Brazil, the US Criminal System understands the delação 
premiada as “part of the game”. After all, we cannot forget that the system is – believe 
it or not – a type of game, where attorney (D.A. and Defender) measures his strength. 
While Brazil, nowadays, seems to be under a new system, the US use it as 
part of his historical Criminal System. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the present work, we proposed to understand the law through a compared 
empirical perspective (Brazil and the U.S.) and performed a thematic delimitation 
notably within the framework of the forms of negotiation in criminal justice in both 
countries: plea bargaining and criminal negotiation. Because these systems are 
derived from considerably distinct sources, we first sought to contextualize them 
according to their traditions. Thus, we can draw several conclusions from the research. 
(1) Despite all of the emphasis of the American universities in transmitting the 
techniques and developing skills in relation to the jury trial, the vast majority of criminal 
cases are resolved through plea bargaining (97% of the cases brought to justice) 
(GOODE, 2012). Although academia itself admits this prevalence, the course of 
informal practices focuses more on jury trial than in the practices of plea bargaining. 
Indeed, there is a paradoxical perception of the self-conception that the actors involved 
in the process have regarding their functions and what would be more relevant in them. 
Everyone in general has the power to negotiate, but only these actors have the 
prerogative to analyze the evidence and require the witnesses to appear in court, 
although under the statistical point of view, what they really do is plea bargaining. 
(2) In this context, the trial techniques are not so relevant. On the contrary, 
there is a revelation of the connection between plea bargaining and the trial. It is as if 
all criminal judicial systems work around the idea of consensus, which in turn is best 
represented by plea bargaining. This would be the main target. 
(3) Trial attorneys are considered the best negotiators due to their skill set and 
therefore often negotiate pleas. The other party foresees that going to trial will be a 
difficult fight. Moreover, the difficulty is not necessarily due to the other party having 
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strong evidence, but the knowledge that your opponent has technical skills (either from 
experience or not) that intimidate you. 
 (4) In the legal process in the U.S., the truth is built according to the rules of 
consensus between the parties.23 What actually occurred is much less important than 
what is agreed regarding the occurrence of the facts. This collides with the Brazilian 
model in which the search for real truth still permeates in the midst of legal theory. 
(5) In Brazil, there is no intention to reach consensus or, in other words, to 
establish the facts, including the evidence to be brought to trial. The logic of this 
contradiction eventually results in the unsuccessful attempt to achieve consensus at 
the basis of the process: the facts. The judge, gathering the contradictory ideas, will 
carry out his judgment upon free conviction. 
(6) The option for bargaining in U.S. law makes the declaration of guilt 
indispensable (RAKOFF, 2014). Moreover, the idea of confession, regret, and 
forgiveness appear to always be linked to local religious rituals (LAURITIZEN, 1987). 
It would be difficult, indeed, to say that in a given society, the religious values should 
be separated from the way in which this same society addresses the regulation of the 
local law. In the case of the U.S., a nation with a very striking Protestant tradition 
(BERMAN, 2008),24 it is not difficult to perceive the intermingling of these issues. 
(8) Contrary to what occurs in the U.S. culture, in Brazil, the maintenance of 
law is more the result of the concealment of the conflict (WINTERS, 2013). In American 
law, the negotiation, as observed by the institution of plea bargaining, is transparent 
(regarding the forms of guilt and truth) and this is the characteristic that legitimizes the 
process (HAMMONG, 2006). Hence, the need to make the comparison by 
confrontation and not by similarity arises because mixing a system of consensus with 
a system of dissent, whether it is accusatory (where charges are public) or inquisitorial 
(where charges are written and secretive) is the heart of the problem. 
(9) In Brazil, the state has the justice in its hands (DOUGLAS, 2015). The King 
is the Emperor (The nature of government, 2014). These differences in the origin of 
                                                     
23 Consensus-Based Decision-Making Processes, CONSENSUS COUNCIL, INC. 3. 
24 In my fieldwork, I could also talk to Judge “M” who said, “I don’t think this simply reflects a Protestant 
tradition. As a practicing Catholic, I am constantly reminded of sin, confession, regret, and forgiveness, 
but I agree that I sometimes feel like I must hear a statement of regret and admission of sin before I can 
‘forgive.’ I think one difference is that we Catholics confess in private. Some Protestants seem to be 
compelled to make public confessions, or at least statements of regret.” 
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the process demonstrate how these systems are anchored in different places. For this 
reason, it is evident that the identification of plea bargaining is linked to this feature of 
discretion, which does not occur in Brazil. 
(10) Victory, game, opponent, and defeat are expressions that denote not only 
a relationship—as could appear at first—with the solution of the disputes found in the 
trials, but also in the negotiation of plea bargaining. The bargain is also performed in 
an arena behind the scenes, which is typical of an adversarial system. However, all of 
these rules, unlike in Brazil, are transparent and are part of the system. 
(11) In U.S. law, the bargain is not limited to the intention of reducing the 
penalty to be imposed. From the moment the accused declares himself guilty, the 
negotiating parties establish their highest degree of discretion. When the prosecutor, 
the lawyer, and the judge start the negotiation, assuming there is a possibility of a 
declaration of guilt, a large opening regarding the “destination” of the accused and the 
legal classification of the committed crime can be “chosen.” Therefore, the prosecution 
will be formulated by a symbolic fact, which is “created” by means of a negotiation. On 
the negotiating table, the penal code does not serve as a parameter for the suitability 
of the practiced conduct, but as a range of options that serves as the helm for the 
choice (pick up) of the punishment to be applied. 
(12) The term “plead guilty,” for citizens in general, is not purely a technical 
legal term. It is expressly and commonly pronounced by them. Unlike in Brazil, where 
information of certain procedures of the criminal proceedings is reserved for the 
experts, all of the classes in the U.S. are familiar with and fully aware of pleading guilty. 
(13) In terms of development, the identification of the diferences in the concept 
of citizenship in Brazil and in the United States is vital to understand the current 
Brazilian juridical landscape and, particularly, the criminal institutes involved. Socio-
economic diferences are typical of a capitalist model, but they do not prevent (on the 
contrary) legal equality, which is a real current attribute for the justification of privileges. 
(14) Unlike plea bargaining, in which there is a consensus between the parties, 
in Brazil, this consensus is introduced by the D.A., who in practice is situated in the 
upper hierarchy. Agreements are not consensual because the parties, specially the 
defendant, do not know the real purpose of each of the hearings. The conciliators, the 
real holders of “power,” want to get rid of the process. Moreover, to achieve this, they 
Revista Jurídica                        vol. 02, n°. 51, Curitiba, 2018. pp. 113-136 
                                                                            DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.6828932 
_________________________________________ 
134 
 
take advantage of a concept that is already known in Brazilian legal culture: the 
process is a problem that one should eliminate. Thus, contrary to what occurs in the 
adversarial system, where the consensus is a remarkable factor, we found that in the 
Brazilian case, the negotiation enjoys a masked inquisitorial characteristic. Moreover, 
this transparency gives legitimacy to the process. 
(15) unlike Brazil, the US Criminal System understands the delação premiada 
as “part of the game”. After all, we cannot forget that the system is – believe it or not – 
a type of game, where attorney (D.A. and Defender) measures his strength. 
While Brazil, nowadays, seems to be under a new system, the US use it as 
part of his historical Criminal System. 
(16) The attempt to import models derived from different legal systems creates 
what is called “cognitive dissonance” (AMORIM, 2003). Both the comparison of the 
similarities between criminal negotiation and plea bargaining and the importation of the 
latter to Brazilian law (as intended by the proposal to reform the CP) collide in the 
problem of the paradox. In the U.S., the due process of law aims at individual 
guarantees, whereas in Brazil, the due process of law has been safeguarding the 
interests of the process itself, which makes it more of a state guarantee than a right of 
individual freedom. 
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